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Abstract 
Present day developments in international space activities in 
a way provide many opportunities for private entities to 
become more involved therein. One interesting phenomenon 
which seems to arise on the horizon in relation to these 
developments concerns the possibility of leasing a spacecraft. 
Questions arising in this regard focus on such issues as 
ownership, whether state or private, in view of the registration-
obligation, and liability for damage and its close link to the 
launching of the spacecraft in question. 
An effort will be made in the paper to briefly analyze the legal 
ramifications of leasing a spacecraft. Hence, firstly a factual 
introduction into the issue of the lease of spacecraft and an 
attempt to define "lease" will be made. 
Secondly, a short survey of relevant elements of the corpus 
juris spatialis will be made, such as Articles VI, VII and VIII 
of the Outer Space Treaty, and parts of the Liability and 
Registration Conventions. As a preliminaty conclusion it will 
be submitted that those provisions of outer space law create 
a link between launching and liability which in some respects 
is rather illogical, especially as far as private enterprise is 
involved, and therefore to a certain extent already bodes ill for 
any occurrence of leasing. 
By way of an illustration in the third part of the paper a short 
overview will be given of the ways in which especially the 
United States and France, as the two prime launching states 
of the capitalist world, cope with this illogical link through 
national provisions concerning liability. 
Finally, in the fourth part the leasing-phenomenon will be 
entered into the equation. The result will be, inter alia, that 
the illogicality of especially the link between launching and 
liability comes to the fore more clearly and strongly, making 
for a perhaps unnecessarily complicated framework for private 
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activities in space. Hence, the notion of leasing seems to 
provide an interesting argument for amending or at least re-
interpreting the relevant parts of space law. 
1. Introduction 
Present day developments in international space activities 
increasingly provide opportunities for private entities to 
become involved in those activities. On the one hand, 
fundamental opposition against private activities is on the 
wane now that communism internationally speaking is no 
longer what it was. And on the other hand, with the increasing 
budgetatyproblems experienced by almost evety state involved 
in space activities, increasing recourse is being sought to 
private funds and other private participation. 
A few interesting phenomena have arisen on the horizon in 
relation to these developments. First, the sharing of a 
spacecraft in terms of its use can take the form of what is 
called the lease of capacity, such as the lease of transponders 
on satellites in use for telecommunication purposes. Thus, for 
example Brazil has leased capacity on INTELSAT satellites 
before it could afford its own domestic satellite 
telecommunication system.1 
Although this example concerns non-private participants, it 
certainly is interesting for private entities as well, for it affords 
private entities, usually with less deep pockets than 
governments, a realistic and attractive opportunity to 
undertake or partake in space activities. And indeed, lease of 
capacity by private entities is not an unknown occurrence 
anymore. 
At the same time, since this possible venue does not seem to 
fundamentally change the practical situation concerning 
ownership of the satellite in question as a whole, this is not 
what should interest us most, here, although vice versa some 
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conclusions resulting from the present analysis may be useful 
for these cases as well. 
That remark on the measure of change occurring does not 
hold good in respect of the second phenomenon. This 
phenomenon concerns the lease of spacecraft as a whole. 
INTELSAT for instance at present has an option with the 
Russian firm Informkosmos to lease up to three of the latter's 
Express satellites.2 Again, this example concerns non-private 
parties to a lease agreement; nevertheless, it is an interesting 
venue for private parties as well, for the same reasons that 
were already mentioned. 
Thirdly, it has even become possible to buy a satellite second-
hand, the way Norway has procured a Marcopolo-I satellite 
from British Sky Broadcasting.3 This phenomenon, the most 
radical of the three, as a matter of fact is so radical that it 
completely alters the practical situation concerning ownership. 
The result namely is a comprehensive shift of control and 
jurisdiction over the object in question, meaning that the legal 
situation becomes less ambiguous again when compared to the 
second phenomenon, although it remains a related one. 
For those reasons, I will concentrate on that second issue, as 
it is here that the largest measure of confusion will arise. 
Professor Wassenbergh recently remarked in a similar context 
that "[t]o avoid legal confusion, it seems indicated, for 
purposes of adjudication of liability, to legally separate the 
''launching state" ( ... ) from space objects as from the moment 
the space Object is placed in orbit"4. He went on to state that 
rather, at such a pOint, the liable state should become equated 
to the responsible state5. To a certain extent, the present 
analysis aims at discovering whether, under the specific 
circumstances of leasing, this would prima facie seem a viable 
option - or at least a valuable approach. 
2. The Definition of "Leasing" 
In order to provide the necessaty preliminaty clarity, first an 
effort will have to be made to circumscribe, if not to define 
outright, the notion of 'leasing'. The term, not being a 
complete newcomer to lawyers' lexicons, tends to be used 
already rather liberally, wherefore the risk begins to loom of 
dialogues with partners on different wave lengths. 
Starting from the outside, speaking not strictly-legally, "lease" 
as a noun has been defined as, principally, "a contract by which 
one party ( ... lessor) gives to another ( ... lessee) the use and 
possession of lands, buildings etc. for a specified time and for 
fixed payments,,6. Note the clause "for a specified time" which 
already points to a fundamental difference with terms such as 
"ownership", and furthermore to the fact that after such time 
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use and possession will automatically return to the (real) 
owner. 
In a similar vein, "lease" is linked most intimately to such 
terms as "benefice", "tenure", "let", "rental" or "hire" rather 
than to "property" and "possession" without further ad07, and 
similarly as a verb is related most closely to "lending", "hiring" 
and "letting"s. 
Narrowing analysis down now to the more strictly legal use of 
the term, "lease" has been defined as "[a]ny agreement which 
gives rise to relationship of ( ... ) lessor and lessee (real or 
personal property)", such as "[c]onveyance, grant or devise of 
reality for designated period with reversion to grantor' or 
"[c]onveyance of interest in real or personal property for 
specified period or at will"g. The difference between 
"ownership" and "lease" as a consequence is also specified: the 
latter "means a contract by which one owning such property 
grants to another the right to possess, use and enjoy it for 
specified period of time in exchange for periodic payment of 
a stipulated price, referred to as rent,,10. 
In summary, the essentials oflease are, on the one hand a vety 
large and almost comprehensive measure of control over the 
property in question (as evidenced by terms such as "use" and 
"possession"), while on the other hand two very fundamental 
aspects detract from full comprehensive control, thus 
distinguishing it from true ownership. These are the 
temporariness of any lease, and the necessity of some form of 
repeated payment for the use and de facto possession pointing 
to the ultimate ownership of the lessor and not of the lessee. 
In other words - but ultimately that depends on the contract -
lease can comprise, and vety often does indeed comprise all 
elements of ownership except ownership itself. It is in this 
sense that the term "lease" will be used in the analysis to 
follow. 
3. Relevant Elements of the Corpus Juris Spatialis 
The definition ofJease as comprising all elements of ownership 
except ownership itself seems to be a crucial one, once one 
next scans the corpus juris spatialis for legal provisions 
relevant for the issue of leasing. More specifically, Article VI 
of the Outer Space Treaty11 and its ramifications under 
general public international law, Article VII of the Outer 
Space Treaty and the elaboration thereof found in the Liability 
Convention 12, and Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty 
together with its elaboration, the Registration Convention 13, 
will have to be scrutinized here. 
3.1. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the 
Registration Convention. 
One should perhaps start in this respect with Article VIII of 
the Outer Space Treaty, where the term "ownership" itself is 
also coined in an illustrative fashion. In relevant part it 
provides for a very strong correlation between the notions of 
'registry', 'jurisdiction and control' and 'ownership', to the 
extent that a state of registry of a certain space object is the 
one supposed and even obliged to exercise jurisdiction and 
control over it and, unless evidence to the contrary is shown, 
at the same time logically must be deemed to be the owner of 
that space object.14 
Vice ve1lS'a that means, that the owner of a space object is a 
logical first candidate for registry - if not indeed by definition -
and the resulting retention of jurisdiction and control, since 
a situation of one state Owning and another state providing for 
registration and consequently having jurisdiction over the same 
space object would be a highly unlikely, if only because 
practically as well as legally complicating situation. 
All this sounds very logical perhaps. Starting from the case of 
a space object really involving only one state and no private 
entity to any significant extent, a state owning a space object 
will indeed have to register it since it is, by presupposition, the 
state which launches it,15 and will hence exercise jurisdiction 
and control over its property in order to fulfill the duties and 
exercise the rights linked to its launching and registration 
activities.16 
In case more states should be considered as Goined) owners, 
in my view usually either an international organization, as 
representing the total of states concerned, or one of the states 
with the others merely holding specific claims over the 
property in question would tum out to be the real owner. In 
case of the latter option, legal. complications could be 
foreclosed by having the 'real owner' register the space object. 
As far as the former possibility is concerned, it causes some 
theoretical problems, since in such cases normally the states 
involved should still take care to have one of them register the 
Object, and consequently exercise jurisdiction and control over 
it17. Even if the organization has the capacity to act as a 
virtual state of registry18 - and ESA so far is the only one 
to do so 19 - it never has the capacity to exercise true 
jurisdiction, since that is a typical and very fundamental 
prerogative of a sovereign state20• Under these 
circumstances legal ownership indeed does not (automatically) 
lead to jurisdiction and control. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same applies if several states after all 
turn out to be truly joined owners of a specific space object 
without the intermediary of an international organization. In 
this case the structure of ownership by presupposition - not 
true joined ownership but one state being the real owner, the 
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others merely having claims upon that property - does not 
already take care of the complications mentioned. A way out 
could be provided here by turning things more or less upside 
down and changing the structure of jurisdiction instead. This 
would result in the provision of an interlocking system of 
multiple jurisdictions l\egJecting the one-registry-Ieads-to-one-
jurisdiction suggestion of Article VIII. In such a manner as 
well, an alignment will occur between jurisdictional and 
ownership-structures, be it that the automatism on this point 
provided for by Article VIII is completely foregone. 
The picture becomes even more complicated finaJJy when 
private enterprise enters the equation. Though perfectly being 
able - under most national legal systems and consequently also 
under international law - of being owners of a space object, 
private entities can neither become states of registry nor 
exercise jurisdiction, since that again is the absolute 
prerogative of a sovereign state. Again, legal ownership is seen 
not to automatically coincide with jurisdiction and control. 
The consequences in theoretical terms of this structure 
provided for by Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the 
whole of the Registration Convention turn out to become even 
more relevant when one considers the relationship between 
Article VIII and two other crucial Articles of the Outer Space 
Treaty, Articles VI and VII. 
3.2. Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability 
Convention. 
To start with the latter, and its elaboration as provided for by 
the Liability Convention, it revolves around the notion of 
'launching state', defined in four different ways21, and the 
liability for damage caused to other actors which goes with 
being a launching state22• 
The link between the ownership-jurisdiction-registry triad of 
Article VIII and the provisions of Article VII is provided by 
the fact that the state of registry is either the launching state, 
if there is only one under the relevant definitions, or one of 
the launching states, in case there is more than one.23 
The first case is once more the simpler one. The state which 
is an exclusive owner of a space object through its qualification 
as exclusive launching state retains not only jurisdiction and 
control over its property in accordance with Article VIII, but 
remains accountable for damage caused by it under Article VII 
as well. Logically, in case private entities become involved, the 
state in question can use its jurisdiction to take care of the 
resultingpotentialliabilityproblems, although one should keep 
in mind that such an extra step is indeed fundamentally 
necessary. Private entities themselves can never qualify as 
'launching states' and therefore can not incur liability by means 
of international space law. 
The second case, with more than one state involved, obviously 
presents more difficulties. Starting again from the assumption 
that private entities are not substantially involved, the normal 
legal situation is that Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty 
and Article II of the Registration Convention provide for only 
one state of registry, even where more than one state qualifies 
as launching state. 
This means that the close link between (single) registry and 
(single) ownership provided by Article VIII is not matched by 
a single state being liable. And in whatever way the Goined) 
ownership of the partner states involved has been construed, 
complementarity with the structure pertaining to liability is not 
in any way provided. All states qualifying as launching states 
remain jointly and severally liable, so this situation would even 
favour true joined ownership rather than Single state-
ownership with concurrent claims of other states. The very fact 
even of having a certain 'claim' on some other state's space 
object namely is to be considered as qualifying the owner of 
the claim as a launching state24 with the resulting liability 
for damage caused by the space object - some other state's 
space object, to be exact. 
On the other hand, as we have seen, a situation of one owner 
and others with certain specific claims on the property in 
question would much better fit in with the fact that Article 
VIII does - in principle - guarantee retention of only one 
jurisdiction, namely that of the state of registry. A very 
complex legal situation arises here indeed. 
Involvement of an international organization in the launch 
further complicates the situation, at least as far as such an 
organization has accepted the rights and obligations of the 
Liability Convention25 and thereby has effectively become 
a relevant entity on its own for the purpose of liability. Suffice 
it to state here however that even registry and ownership of 
a space object by an international organization do not co'incide 
with liability comprehensively; ultimately the states member 
of the organization will remain accountable for any damage 
arising.26 
Even larger problems loom once private entities become 
involved in a substantial sense in the launChings, either with 
one state or with more than one state or even an international 
organization qualifying as launching state. Under Article VII 
and the Liability Convention private entities can not be held 
liable for damage caused by space objects in whose launch they 
are involved, not even if they launched them themselves or are 
the owners of the space objects in question. 
Instead, for the purpose of identifying the liable entities a look 
still remains to be had at the fourfold definition of launching 
state, making one or more states, even in cases of private 
ownership, liable. Of course, jurisdiction again would point out 
how this problem could be tackled: by the creation of national 
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legislation providing for licensing requirements and derogation 
clauses27• 
3.3. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Finally, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty plays a confusing 
role in this respect as well. I do not wish to go too deep into 
the matter here.28 Suffice it to state that, while the Article 
itself does not explicitly provide for a link of responsibility, 
which is the core notion of the Article, with jurisdiction, just 
like Articles VII and VIII provide for a link of liability with 
jurisdiction and/or ownership, the contents of it hardly allow 
for an a contrario-conclusion29• A state having jurisdiction 
over a space object will have to be held responsible for the 
activities in which the latter is involved. 
Relating the essence of this provision squarely back to the 
ownership-question, one can preliminarily conclude that, 
similar to the situation on liability, states can incur 
responsibility for activities involving space objects of which 
they are not the (sole) owners, either because another state 
is the (real) owner and provides for registration, hence 
retaining jtlrisdiction under Article VIII, or because an 
international organization or a private entity is. For, like it is 
the case with liability, both under Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty and under general public international law2° 
with only few exceptions only states can be held internationaIly 
responsible for certain activities and their consequences, even 
if the real actors, i.e. owners of space objects involved in 
certain activities, are private entities (or international 
organizations for that matter)31. 
The liability-issue generally speaking is a more interesting one 
than the responsibility-question, especially for private 
enterprise, since it directly relates to financial questions and 
claims in cases of (material) damage, where this fact 
concerning responsibility is hardly acknowledged32• 
Nevertheless, by means of the notion of responsibility also 
states can be held to compensate materially for damage caused 
by a space Object owned by a non-state entity, whether private 
or otherwise. The automatic link between liability and 
launChing, effectively matched moreover by a link between 
responsibility for activities of the space object in question in 
a broader sense but also including launching, even before 
entering the question of leasing into the equation, becomes an 
interesting problem for that reason already. 
4. Two Case Studies 
Before refocussing on this problem and the solution suggested 
supra by Professor Wassenbergh therefore, it is interesting to 
take a closer look at two cases specifically elaborating the 
international liability regime, of two states very regularly 
involved in the launch of space objects: the United States and 
France. Within the Western world, still the most capitalist of 
worlds, those two states would no doubt be or become most 
involved therefore also in the lease issues to be discussed, 
simply because they provide by far the best opportunities for 
private entities to become involved in space activities, read: to 
launch a space object alternatively to have one launched for 
them, as much as they do so for other states. 
Since those situations are most telling for the issue of leasing 
as well, it will also be of interest to see whether and how the 
two states concerned have 'merely' aligned their domestic legal 
frameworks for space activities with the complexity reigning 
under international space law, or whether they have perhaps 
tried to simplify alternatively correct that situation. 
4.1. The United States. 
The United States have the longest and broadest experience 
with regard to launching activities on behalf of others. Until 
two decades ago, however, those others were exclusively states, 
or international intergovernmental organizations such as 
INTELSAT acting on behalf of their member states, and as 
a 'consequence' the space objects sent into outer space were 
publicly owned.33 For that reason, the owners, if states34, 
were co-liable for any potential damage since by definition they 
had 'procured' the launching35• 
If the owner happened to be an international organization, 
things were a little bit more complicated, but not much so. 
Even in the case of the organization having accepted the rights 
and obligations under the liability Convention36, it were in 
the end still the member states who could be held to pay for 
damage arising directly under the regime of international space 
la~7. Either way, the United States could easily take the 
necessary precautions in respect of its position as potentially 
liable state by means of contract. 
. Coming to private involvement next, as was already mentioned, 
private entities can not be held liable by international space 
law itself. In as far as that meant that private enterprise, 
whether US or foreign, hired the services of the government's 
launching agency, as which NASA operated, the same venue 
would be taken basically as in cases of foreign states 
demanding NASA's services as a launch vehicle operator but 
with no other US government involvement. The contract of 
launch would provide for the buyer of the launching services 
to take the final burden of any third-party liability arising as 
a consequence through derogation-clauses.3S 
The other potential form private inVolvement in launches 
undertaken from US territory could take, is that of 
undertaking the launch activities themselves, whether in the 
service of the US government, of foreign governments, or 
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other private entities. This situation of course diminished the 
measure of direct US government involvement in principle to 
the bare minimum of 'merely' lending territory and facility for 
the launch - which nevertheless still meant the United States 
could be held liable. Once therefore the policy decision at high 
levels within the US government was taken to allow and even 
stimulate such forms of private involvement, it was 
immediately accompanied with the establishment of national 
legislation dealing with the legal issues arising inter alia as a 
consequence of the pertinent internationalliability-regime.39 
The Commercial Space Launch Act was therefore enunciated 
in 1984, with Amendments in 1988 substantially altering some 
of its, for private enterprise most crucial provisions.40 What 
remained was, for any private enterprise operating from US 
territory, the requirement of a license, to be granted only after 
a number of conditions would have been fulfilled41 , and the 
obligation to reimburse the US government for any claim 
arising under the internationalliability-regime42. 
What does that mean for the present issue? By way of 
summary conclusion of the foregoing, domestic American 
legislation does provide for the extra step necessary to involve 
private entities, whether US or non-US, in a sensible way in 
potential liability claims. It does so by filling in the 
international space law liability system, without adding 
substantially to or detracting substantially from the legal 
implications of ownership of a space object. 
Ownership of anynon-US-governmental space object involving 
the United States' liability, whether a launch vehicle launched 
from US territory or facilities or another space object on 
board of a launch vehicle launched from US territory or 
facilities, through that extra step will basically incur liability. 
On the other hand, the anomalies and complexities of the 
international system have not been taken care of either, 
domestically speaking. 
4.2. Prance and the European Space Agemy. 
With regard to France, the actual situation is somewhat 
different. To begin with, the launch base relevant for 
international space activities, Kourou, does not find itself in 
France-proper, but in one of the overseas departments (the 
"departements doutre-mer'): French Guyana. Since French 
Guyana however still falls under French sovereignty43, 
launches from Kourou for that reason alone already turn 
France into a launching state and hence a liable state in 
respect of the space objects concerned. 
Apart from that, the situation becomes more complicated. The 
launching facilities were built by France, later on extended with 
the help of the European Space Agency which also started 
operations there - helped in turn by the French national space 
agency, the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES) - with 
Arianespace since a number of years actually as its sole 
important customer.44 
That makes, to begin with, ESA liable as well, since ESA has 
promulgated the declaration required thereto under Article 
XXII of the Uability Convention. As ESA is also the owner 
of many of the satellites brought into outer space from 
Kourou, in those cases liability is relatively simply dealt with 
by space law directly, with basically France and ESA, and 
subsidiarily (the) other member states of ESA, having to pay 
once their Gointly or severally)45 owned space objects cause 
damage. In cases involving other states' or other organizations' 
(such as for instance EUTELSAT's) satellites, launch contracts 
could still deal with this kind of complications in the way 
already indicated. 
With the involvement of Arianespace the situation becomes 
different however. Arianespace is the embodiment so far of 
privatization of the launching activities themselves in Europe, 
and since it had started operating Kourou, back in 1979,46 
the other problems already touched upon in regard of private 
enterprise have come to the fore in theory here as well. 
Arianespace, to be exact, is a private company established 
under French law47 and hence basicaIly a French enterprise, 
but with important international involvement: apart from 
CNES, some 50 banks and other industrial firms, from France 
as well as from other ESA member states, are its 
shareholders48• 
As a private company it is not to be held liable under 
international space law directly, so at the time of establishment 
of Arianespace the French government took care to derogate 
any claims arising as a consequence of international space law, 
against ESA as well as against France itself, to Arianespace, 
be it that it took it upon itself not to derogate any amount 
above the first FF 400 million of any c1aim49• 
As to the other form of private involvement, private entities 
buying someone's launching services at Kourou - which since 
a number of years means hiring Arianespace - that launch 
service provider again takes care of any potential claims 
against France or ESA by means of the contract, namely 
through inclusion of the price of the insurance necessary to 
cover Arianespace's client as well, up to the FF 400 million-
mark, in the launching price.50 Any owner of such a space 
object, whether from an ESA member state or from outside, 
would hence be indirectly confronted through such a contract 
with the financial consequences of the international third-party 
liability regime. 
The difference with the situation in the United States here lies 
primarily in the relative simplicity and informality of the 
arrangement in the France/ESA case as opposed to the 
comprehensiveness of the licensing system pertaining in the 
United States. Still, for all launches conducted from Kourou 
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the extra step as to liability is provided for, meaning that any 
owner of a space object launched from Kourou, whether 
private or public, will ultimately be held liable, at least by 
contract. Once more however, this measure only fills in the 
international system, without adding to, or rectifying it. 
In conclusion, both the United States and France have, be it 
through somewhat different mechanisms, to a rather 
comprehensive extent taken care of their liability being 
possibly invoked by reason of their territory being used for the 
launch, qualifying them as launching states, including cases 
involving private entities. That is, as long as the ownership of 
the space objects involved does not change; what happens jf 
it does, or changes color in a manner of speaking, still remains 
to be seen. 
5. The Effect of Leasing in Legal Terms 
Finally therefore the phenomenon of leasing is to be entered 
into the equation now. To start with, this phenomenon should 
be seen in connection with the problem of states being 
involved in the launch of space objects which are not their own 
to the extent of qualifying as a launching state under the 
relevant prOvisions of space law. This makes them liable for 
damage caused by the space objects concerned. 
Solutions for this problem at least in principle are rather 
simple, and have indeed been implemented on every relevant 
occasion. Through contractual arrangements, the owners of 
space objects - basically satellites, since expendable launch 
vehicles are, almost by definition and at least in actual fact, 
always owned by the state from whose territory the launch was 
conducted or by that state's nationals - are usually obliged to 
reimburse other states - notably the state whose sole 
involvement exists in lending its territory and/or facilities for 
the launch - in cases where claims for liability are laid at the 
latter's doorsteps. 
Nevertheless, in my opinion this is a serious flaw in the logic 
of the liability regime, leading to the need for rather complex 
contracts. Such contractual arrangements would not have been 
necessary if the launch of a space object would not have been 
made so all-important for apportioning liability as it is. Under 
the present system a state solely involved in the launch of a 
satellite by lending its territory can still be held liable if years 
after the launch the satellite in question would happen to 
cause damage, for reasons which under normal logic and law 
would not have been attributed to that state. 
The disadvantageous implications of this flawed structure 
become eVen clearer and more pronounced when we take the 
problem one step further, and one step closer to the lease-
issue. Suppose that sometime after the launch the satellite will 
be sold by its owner to a new owner, and then proceeds to 
cause damage - because of certain activities of that new owner. 
The new owner in principle need not be potentially liable 
under the present regime provided by space law, because he 
could very well have had nothing to do with the launch in the 
first place. The first owner, who by definition has had a lot to 
do with the launch, on the other hand remains liable for 
something which is no longer his! Of course, the problem in 
this particular shape can be regulated away in specific 
instances by contractually arranging for complete 
reimbursement in the contract of sale - making extra clauses 
necessary nevertheless, for every specific instance. Another 
appearance of the problem, however, can not as easily be dealt 
with. 
A state merely involved in the original launch by the use of its 
territory, not being the owner of the satellite, is not a party to 
the contract of sale, and hence can not use that very contract 
as an instrument for guaranteeing reimbursement where it 
nevertheless remains liable into eternity for damage caused: 
it will have to do so by its own contract regarding the launch. 
All this, theoretically speaking, applies as much if the old and 
new owners are other states or if they are private entities. 
Another kind of problem - which so far remains theoretical, 
and therefore needs only mentioning at this point - occurs in 
respect of the phenomenon of aerospace planes. Taking off in 
a similar ways as airplanes, the notion of 'launching' does not 
apply to them, yet they - or satellites brought into outer space 
by them - of course may very well cause damage in outer space 
or from outer space which nevertheless escapes from the 
provisions of the present space law-liability regime. 
Then we finally arrive at the issue of 'leasing', of handing over 
effectively the most important or even all elements of 
ownership without actually transferring ownership as such. In 
any of the cases considered before, that means that the lessor 
still holds ownership, with all apparent due consequences in 
terms of registration, jurisdiction and liability - directly if the 
lessor is a state, indirectly through juridical filling in-activities 
if the lessor is a private entity, in yet a different indirect 
manner if the lessor is an international organization. 
Yet, actual control over the space object in question, usually 
a satellite, by the very act of leasing has been handed over to 
the lessee, who remains however outside of any liability-
problems unless he was already involved in the launch as a 
launching state on other accounts. A fortiori this holds good 
for a private lessee, who, as stated, can never be held liable 
directly under international space law. 
Thus, for the very reason of such actual control of course, it 
is the lessee who really should be seen as the causer of any 
damage to result from activities of the space object in 
question! 
355 
In principle, again, this divergence of ultimate control versus 
legal accountability could yet be taken care of by means of the 
lease-contract, providing for derogation of any liability-claims 
by the lessor to the lessee during the time of the lease. That 
is, if at least the lessor is a state, alternatively itself held to 
derogate under any filling in-provision. 
Apart from the fact, that the awareness of such possible events 
should be present at the time of conclusion of the relevant 
contracts, such a construction rapidly becomes overly 
cumbersome and complex. To protect itself the state merely 
lending its territory for a launch would similarly have to 
include relevant provisions in the contract of launch. 
As was already alluded to, where ownership itself is not 
automatically complemented by jurisdiction and/or liability, the 
addition of another element to the chain by means of leasing 
provides for the serious risk of states finding liability claims 
on their doorstep, because of them having launched or having 
provided territory for the launch of somebody else's space 
object, possibly privately owned, which was later on leased to 
yet somebody else, possibly again a private entity, who was 
thereby in the position to cause the damage leading to the 
liability claim in the flrst place. 
The first state in this chain may have little overview and little 
control over what happens at the end of the chain, and even 
finds itself - as in the cases of US-licensed or Arianespace-
undertaken launches, where the latter seems to provide for 
theoretically speaking larger problems since there is no official 
licensing-regime in place which would considerably ease 
routinely included provisions and guarantee the necessary 
openness - effectively co-insuring an entity, private or public, 
for which such a form of support was never meant! 
6. Conclusion 
Coming back to Professor Wassenbergh's proposed solution; 
would it indeed help to legally separate the launching and the 
liability in legal terms, to the extent that liability goes with 
launching only during the launch phase? 
I submit it does, provided that in addition it is clear, or if such 
an interpretation can not be upheld, that it should be enforced 
by new mechanisms, that once the launching phase has ended 
liability should be incurred by the very entity - directly if a 
state, indirectly if an international organization or a private 
enterprise - having control over that particular phase of 
operation of the space object concerned. 
In other words: I would strongly advise severing the link of 
liability to launching, finally shown to be illogical through 
entering the notion of 'leasing' into the equation, and instead 
(re)instalJing a link of the duty to compensate for damage to 
the actor actually causing that damage, in other words: of 
using Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and the resulting 
responsibility for any national activities • not just launching 
activities • for the allocation of claims for the compensation 
of damage. The special role for private enterprise could then 
very well be taken care of through the concurrent requirement 
of authorization and continuing supervision by the state 
concerned, provided for by that same Article VI. 
Maybe any sword of theory will in the end get stuck in the 
Gordian knot of practical reality and established procedure, 
however imperfect, but the risk is worth taking, if only because 
it will - hopefully - result in more insight into the complexities 
and ramifications of that Gordian knot. 
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